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ABSTRACT 
 
Drawing on interviews with the heads of the workout units of a non-probability sample of 12 
Austrian banks, this exploratory study investigates the relationship between distressed borrowers 
and their banks. The heterogeneous sample was selected based on several structural factors with 
one main criterion being the regional or international focus of the respective bank. The findings 
suggest that internal loan workouts are the predominant and preferred strategy amongst most 
interviewed banks. However, while the international banks do not restructure at all costs, working 
out the distressed nature of the loan appears to be the overarching objective of regional and 
smaller banks. By implication, the regional banks were found to be more ‘hands-on’ when dealing 
with distressed loans than their larger international counterparts. Active loan workout processes 
and specialised units were also found to be part of both international and regional banks’ 
strategies to deal with distressed loans. The regional banks were also more inclined to include the 
relationship banker in the workout process and tend to take longer to workout distressed loans. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
he quality of a lender’s loan book is central to ensuring that the risk it faces is managed effectively. 
When borrowers experience problems, be it cash flow or operational, the inability to service their debt 
in turn places the lender under pressure. Besides the obvious losses with regards to interest income, 
the lender is forced to become actively involved in recouping as much from the distressed loan as possible. In 
addition, these losses result in reputational effects that may have a knock-on effect on the sourcing of loans going 
forward.  
 
Therefore, the ability of a bank to manage the credit risk inherent to its loan book is part and parcel of the 
normal operations of a bank. The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007-2009 and the subsequent sovereign debt 
crisis in the Eurozone have placed more pressure on borrowers. Hence, the quality of bank assets and specifically 
loans has deteriorated significantly since the advent of the GFC (Nkusu 2011; Beck et al. 2013). This has led to a 
significant increase in the percentage of distressed loans on the balance sheets of banks (Ernst & Young 2013). Non-
performing loans (NPLs) and sub-performing loans (SPLs) are thus unattractive to banks for a number of reasons. 
Apart from write-offs that impair profit and the balance sheet, these loans are associated with additional expenses 
that result from their monitoring, the negotiation of workout arrangements, the disposal of granted collateral and 
diverted focus of the bank’s managers (Berger and DeYoung 1997). It is therefore not in the best interests of the 
bank to have loans that are not performing as they carry a higher degree of risk. Since Basel II stipulates higher risk 
weights for borrowers with a low creditworthiness, distressed loans increase the related capital requirements of 
banks (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2004). Together with the higher capital demands placed on banks 
by the Basel III requirements, distressed loans are associated with significantly higher costs of capital for the bank. 
These costs ultimately result in banks holding more capital, which in itself is expensive. Furthermore, Basel III 
T 
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makes explicit mention of improving both the quantity and quality of capital held (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision 2011) – the extent of this is therefore directly affected by the underlying quality of the loans granted by 
a bank. Consequently, banks have been forced to become more vigilant to identify and manage the ensuing credit 
losses associated with distressed loans. 
 
Previous research mainly focused on the determinants of problem loans and linked their volume to 
macroeconomic factors such as GDP (growth), public debt, unemployment, interest rates and credit terms as well as 
bank-specific factors such as ownership structure, management quality and performance (e.g., Shehzad et al. 2010; 
Nkusu 2011; Louzis et al. 2012; Filip 2014; Chaibi and Ftiti 2015). Another strand of literature analysed the 
structure of various markets for distressed loans mainly in the US but also Asian and European countries (e.g., 
McIver 2005; Schalast et al. 2006; Altman 2014) and problem loan transactions in these markets (e.g., Schäfer 2007; 
Dick 2010). While some papers investigated distressed loans from a public policy perspective in order to develop 
bank regulation and government intervention (e.g., Istrate et al. 2007; Nkusu 2011), others stressed the lender-client 
relationship within problem loans and analysed the role of the bank in the restructuring process. This latter strand of 
research mainly focused on firm clients and therefore the bank’s impact on and measures applied in the corporate 
restructuring process (e.g., Gilson 1990; Franks and Sussman 2005; Davydenko and Franks 2008, Blazy et al. 2014). 
However, distressed loans comprise a vast array of loan types ranging from business loans over mortgages to 
consumer loans. Moreover, there is a relative paucity of empirical studies on how banks manage their distressed 
loans in general, how they organise the workout process and which measures they undertake in order to minimise 
loan losses. In this paper we address these concerns and draw on a qualitative study among Austrian banks to in-
depth investigate the processes in managing and dealing with distressed loans.  
 
More specifically, the paper aims to: 
 
1. provide insights into the workout process of Austrian banks, 
2. analyse the different strategies Austrian banks rely on to identify and manage distressed loans,  
3. identify the criteria which influence the selection of loan workout strategies and  
4. investigate whether or not the strategies employed among various types of banks differ according to 
strategic focus and/or size. 
 
This way the present study’s contributions to theory and practice are threefold. First, it sheds light on the 
rather neglected processes within banks to deal with distressed loans by providing insights into how banks organise 
the workout process and manage their problem loans. Second, the qualitative research design of the present study 
complements previous research that was exclusively quantitative in nature by allowing an in-depth and 
comprehensive analysis of the multifaceted cause and effect relations observed in the banks’ workout strategies and 
thus a better understanding of the underlying processes, contents and dynamics. Third, our survey focuses on 
Austria, a country with a bank-based financial system that is hardly ever included in lending research (Kaufmann 
and Valderrama 2004). Banks are by far the predominant financial intermediaries in Austria’s financial system 
(OeNB 2009) and they contribute a large portion of financing for non-financial corporations as well as private 
households (OeNB 2014). As in Germany (Brunner und Krahnen 2008), banks are normally directly involved in 
crisis management and play a dominant role in that process because of their extensive business relationships. Hence, 
the case of Austria provides a perfect example for studying the management of distressed loans. It adds to the 
existing body of knowledge by investigating the motives banks have to solve the distressed nature of the loan and 
subsequently avoid credit losses.  
 
The structure of the paper is as follows: section two provides a literature review that focuses on the 
background to the Austrian banking sector, establishing what distressed loans are, the internal processes within a 
bank when dealing with distressed loans and lastly the different strategies bankers use when resolving distressed 
loans. Following this, the research methods are provided followed by the findings, the analysis and discussion of the 
findings and then the study concludes. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Austrian Banking Sector 
 
The Austrian banking sector is regarded as being universal in nature. Banks are by far the predominant 
financial intermediaries in the country’s financial system (OeNB 2009) whereby the banks are organised by sub-
sectors. Depending on their legal form and the traditional focus of their business, they are assigned to one of eight 
sectors including joint stock banks, savings banks, state mortgage banks and co-operative banks. Although this 
sectoral classification is still in use, it has rather historical roots and the distinctions between them have become 
increasingly blurred. With the exception of special purpose banks, Austrian banks offer the full range of banking 
products and services (OeNB 2004; OeNB 2009). 
 
Differences amongst Austrian banks stem less from their affiliation with a certain sector than from their 
strategic orientation and whether or not they primarily focus on regional (one or certain Austrian regions) or 
international markets (various countries, including Austria). While the focus of savings, co-operative and mortgage 
banks have traditionally been regional, a few have grown in size and entered national and even international 
markets. The international Austrian banks have their main foreign business focus on the markets in Central, Eastern 
and Southeastern Europe (CESEE). After the fall of the iron curtain, Austrian banks have taken advantage of the 
historical ties and proximity to the CESEE countries and established subsidiaries as well as acquired local banks in 
these markets (OeNB 2009). 
 
2.2 Creditor-Borrower-Relationship and Distressed Loans 
 
Every lending relationship is characterised by information asymmetry (the borrower is better informed than 
the financier) and conflicting interests between the creditor and the borrower. The agency costs resulting from this 
situation can prevent a financing relationship a priori (adverse selection problem) or lead to the so-called moral 
hazard problem. Once the capital funds have been raised from outside creditors, the borrower has an incentive to 
misallocate these funds by using them in a way that benefits himself but not necessarily the lender(s). These 
problems are exacerbated in the case of distress. Due to the uncertainty inherent in a crisis situation the information 
asymmetry increases. Moreover, in distressed companies the quality of information that is available is often poor 
(Bris et al. 2006; Brunner and Krahnen 2008) and there are incentives of the managers for earnings management in 
their accounting choices (DeAngelo et al. 1994). In case of private borrowers this seems to be even worse. Of 
particular relevance in times of financial distress is the more likely opportunistic behaviour of the distressed 
borrowers given that they have, as it were, little to lose (Fischel 1989).  
 
A formal definition of distressed loans is difficult to find. Within the ambit of so-called distressed loans, 
they are referred to as ‘problem loans’, ‘delinquent loans’, ‘troubled loans’, ‘impaired loans’, ‘bad loans’, ‘non-
performing loans (NPLs)’, ‘sub-performing loans (SPLs)’ or ‘loans on watch list’. The terms are either used 
interchangeably or clustered together to reflect their relative degree of impairment. By en-large, distressed loans 
refer to those loans where the borrower fails to meet the contractual obligations to the lender. Since there is no well-
recognised international standard, the definitions of distressed loans vary widely across countries (Barisitz 2013; 
Beck et al. 2013). According to the proposal of the Institute of International Finance (cited in Beck et al. 2013), a 
bank’s loan portfolio can be classified into five main groups, namely, standard, watch, substandard, doubtful and 
loss/write-off. While the broadest definition of NPLs comprises all categories of impaired loans, others rely on 
narrower classifications and only refer to the last two categories or only the loss loans (Dick 2010; Beck et al. 2013). 
The spectrum of problem loans can be divided into defaulted loans (narrowest definition of NPLs) for which a loss 
or write-off occurred and SPLs, for which some kind of impairment (e.g, amount in arrears) but no default occurred 
(see Figure 1 below). 
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Figure 1. The spectrum of distressed loans within a bank’s loan portfolio 
  
Source: Authors 
 
In Austria, the Financial Market Authority (FMA) issued the Minimum Standards for the Credit Business 
and other Transactions entailing Counterparty Risk (FMA-MS-K) in 2005 that provides “the Austrian credit 
institutions with guidelines on how to structure the credit business in terms of organisation and processes“ (FMA-
MS-K 2005 paragraph 1). The FMA-MS-K (2005 paragraph 22b) recommend instructions and processing principles 
for intensified handling and the management of problem loans. Intensified handling should apply to loans whose risk 
assessment has deteriorated, but not to the extent that it is considered to be bad loans (FMA-MS-K 2005 paragraph 
65). Consequently, intensified handling can be regarded as the pre-stage dealings of bad loans and the distinction 
between NPLs (in a narrow sense) and SPLs appears expedient.  
 
NPLs (in a narrow sense) are defaulted loans. With regards to default, the Basel II accord (Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision 2004 paragraph 452) specifies amongst other things that the obligor is past due more than 
90 days. Especially this criterion of 90 days overdue is considered to be a “reference” and commonly used for 
classification (Rottke and Gentgen 2008; Beck et al. 2013). Apart from the number of days in arrears (which might 
also vary between countries), NPL classification criteria also take into account other dimensions such as whether or 
not bankruptcy or another judicial procedure has been started or indicates the financial performance of the debtor. 
There are also differences in delineation amongst these criteria, the treatment of collateral and guarantees, the 
classification of restructured loans and the assignment of multiple loans by one borrower (European Banking 
Coordination Vienna Initiative 2012; Beck et al. 2013). It should be noted that the definition of a ‘defaulted loan’ 
can be subjective. For example, Koch and MacDonald (2010:565) refer to a loan default as one where “the borrower 
has violated any loan covenants.” 
 
SPLs are considered loans that are impaired, but have not yet defaulted. They are typically characterised by 
a delay of payment of less than 90 days or, alternatively, a high probability of default (loans on watch list) 
(Froitzheim et al. 2006; Dick 2010). Banks often categorise as sub-performing those loans that are transferred to 
intensified handling (Schuppener 2006; Windhöfel 2006).  
 
2.3 Organisational Processes and Strategies to Resolve Distressed Loans 
 
Financial contracting theory attempts to overcome agency problems by designing the financing contract in 
a way that the interests of the capital seeker and the financier are aligned (contractual-based approach) and/or that 
allows numerous supervisory rights to be granted to the investor (monitoring-based approach). For this reason, the 
departure point for any bank with regards to it dealing with distressed loans is its formal loan policy. According to 
Koch and MacDonald (2010:555-556), the loan policy “formali[s]es lending guidelines […] identifies preferred loan 
qualities and establishes procedures for granting, documenting, and reviewing loans.” It therefore provides the 
blueprint from which bankers assess, manage, and, should it occur, deal with distressed loans. Part of the 
management of loans is to review their performance. Two functions ensure this, namely the monitoring of existing 
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loans and the handling of distressed loans (Koch and MacDonald 2010). Should a borrower violate any covenant or 
specific stipulations of the original loan agreement, the bank is entitled to request immediate correction thereof. 
Should this not be possible, the loan becomes distressed and further action needs to be taken from the bank to 
recover any current or future losses. 
 
The internal workout (or review) process banks use in order to deal with distressed loans is crucially 
important to ensure the speedy recovery and/or treatment of the loan. The longer such a loan is distressed, the more 
the resources needed by the bank to recover it. Banks must thus ensure that not only are the loans dealt with 
speedily, but that the bank does this without excessive losses. Therefore, banks often have specialised departments 
dealing specifically with distressed loans (Franks and Sussman 2005; Couwenberg and de Jong 2006). 
 
Since distressed loans carry a higher degree of risk, they are unattractive because of the Basel II and III 
requirements (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2004, 2011). Apart from write-offs that impair profit and 
the balance sheet, these loans are associated with additional expenses that result from their monitoring, the 
negotiation of workout arrangements, the disposal of granted collateral and diverted focus of the bank’s managers 
(Berger and DeYoung 1997). In Austria, the FMA-MS-K of 2005 intensify the requirements for banks in the lending 
process, and specifically, the management, monitoring and reporting of distressed loans in particular has been 
tightened significantly in recent years. The standards contain detailed instructions regarding the processing of SPLs 
and NPLs (FMA-MS-K 2005 paragraphs 65-71). Moreover, ad-hoc reporting requirements stipulate that bank 
managers and involved decision-makers must be informed immediately of any high-risk events that could threaten 
the bank from a risk perspective. For example, typical events include developments related to exceeding limits, 
creditworthiness deterioration and increased risk provisioning or write-offs to name only a few (FMA-MS-K 2005 
paragraph 90). This implies that increasing personnel and other resources are tied to distressed loans, making them 
more unattractive to banks.  
 
Generally, four main strategies to resolve distressed loans are typically used by banks. The most common 
strategy applied by banks is to establish and/or use their loan workout departments. This internal loan workout 
implies that the bank keeps distressed loans in-house and tries to resolve them by negotiating with the borrower. 
More specifically, loan workout is an “[a]ctivity […] that focuses on delinquent loans and tries to develop and 
implement strategies designed to recover as much as possible from troubled borrowers” (Rose and Hudgins 2008: 
688). This comprises all activities that range from the restructuring of the loan to its termination and the seizing of 
the borrower’s collateral. However, the goal is to recover both current and future loan losses and requires hands-on 
handling of the distressed loan by committed workout specialists. Ideally, instead of, for example, liquidating assets 
of the troubled clients in order to recoup loan losses, banks would prefer restructuring the loan agreement in such a 
way that both the bank and the borrower are able to continue in their normal operations (Rose and Hudgins 2008).  
 
Whether loan workouts are restructuring- or liquidation-oriented, they typically require intense negotiations 
between the bank and the borrower (Koch and MacDonald 2010). Therefore, the decision on whether or not to work 
out a distressed loan is often dependent on the strength of the banking relationship between the bank and the 
borrower. The notion of a so-called Hausbank (or main bank) not only reflects the commitment from the bank 
through troubled times (Elsas and Krahnen 1998), but also promotes investment and improves the performance of 
the borrower (Elsas and Krahnen 2004). Therefore, the stronger the Hausbank relationship, the more willing the 
bank is to work out the problem loan, especially if the distressed loan has a positive net present value (Elsas and 
Krahnen 2004).  
 
Commonly used in German-speaking countries, a bank pool is a “legal institution aimed at coordinating 
lender interests in distress” (Brunner and Krahnen 2008:415). More specifically, a bank pool is defined as a formal 
contractual arrangement in which the participating banks pool their individual claims vis-á-vis a particular distressed 
borrower in order to coordinate their decisions and actions (Brunner and Krahnen 2008). In essence, bank pools 
enable multiple lenders the opportunity to collectively deal with distressed loans, which in turn implies that multiple 
banking relationships are dealt with simultaneously.  
 
A further alternative for banks is to transfer the distressed loan to a so-called ‘bad bank’. A bad bank is an 
efficient way to cleanse the balance sheet from distressed loans and thus “freeing the bank from the distraction, costs 
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and use of resources inherent in managing a portfolio of troubled loans” (Ernst & Young 2013:12). This bad bank 
approach has recently been used by several countries in Europe including Germany, Spain and Ireland (Ernst and 
Young 2013). In many cases state guaranteed, bad banks enable banks to reestablish financial market stability by 
removing the uncertainty within the banking sector (Freixas 2010; van Suntum and Ilgmann 2013).  
 
Since the 1990s, a vibrant secondary market for bank loans has developed (Gande and Saunders 2012). 
Loan sales occur when a bank sells off its loans to specialised investors including for example other banks, 
insurance companies, pension funds or security dealers (Rose and Hudgins 2008). This allows banks to diversify 
their loan portfolios, comply with risk-adequacy regulations and redeploy capital to more profitable projects 
(Pennacchi 1988; Carlstrom and Samolyk 1995; Parlour and Plantin 2008; Drucker and Puri 2009) and seems 
extremely valuable in the case of distressed loans. Besides providing a source of cash from the sale, engaging in loan 
sales is usually done in order to get rid of low-yielding loans and reduce both credit and interest rate risk from the 
balance sheet of the bank (Rose and Hudgins 2008).  
 
3. RESEARCH METHODS 
 
Given that this paper attempts to explore in-depth the manner in which Austrian banks deal with the 
distressed loans (and the distressed clients) and to study in particular how they organise the workout process and 
select specific loan workout strategies, a qualitative research design seemed most appropriate. The Austrian banking 
sector is characterised by different types of banks, distinguished predominantly by sector, geographical strategic 
focus (either regional or international), size, and whether or not the bank is listed on the Vienna Stock Exchange. In 
order to identify whether or not different types of banks are incentivised to handle the relationship differently when 
attempting to workout distressed loans, a multiple case study approach (Eisenhardt 1989; Yin 2014) was most fitting 
to investigate the current modus operandi of Austrian banks with regards to identifying and managing distressed 
loans.  
 
A diverse sampling strategy (Eisenhardt 1989) was adopted and a heterogeneous sample (Higginbottom 
2004; Yin 2011; Patton 2015) selected that varied in several structural factors. This was done in order to gain 
diversified insights and to increase the (analytical) generalisability of the findings (Eisenhardt 1989; Yin 2014). A 
general overview of the sample banks and their characteristics in terms of strategic focus and size is presented in 
Table 1. One main selection criterion was the strategic focus of the bank, distinguishing between regional and 
international focus. This does not suggest that regional banks have no foreign customers or customers from other 
regions within Austria, but rather that they concentrate their business in the region where they are located. 
Conversely, the target market for international banks comprises many countries, with Austria being one of them. 
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Table 1. The selection criteria used for the banks in the sample 
 STRATEGIC FOCUS SIZE (ASSETS) SIZE (EMPLOYEES) 
 International Regional > € 50 bn. €5-50 bn. < €5 bn > 5,000 1,001- 5,000 ≤	 1,000 
Bank A 1  1   1   
Bank B  1   1   1 
Bank C  1  1   1  
Bank D 1  1   1   
Bank E  1  1   1  
Bank F  1   1   1 
Bank G  1  1   1  
Bank H 1  1   1   
Bank I  1   1   1 
Bank J 1   1  1   
Bank K  1  1    1 
Bank L 1   1   1  
Total 5 7 3 6 3 4 4 4 
 
Data were collected with the help of semi-structured interviews (Qu and Dumay 2011) in order to allow the 
respondents to give elaborate feedback and to ensure flexibility. Expert interviews (Rowley 2012) with the heads of 
the workout departments from the selected 12 Austrian banks were conducted in April, May and June of 2012. 
Given that these department heads are actively involved in the management of distressed loans (while 
simultaneously being senior executive management with decision-making authority), they are considered to be “key 
informants” (Kumar et al. 1993) and thus a vital source of information within the context of this study. The 
interviews lasted anywhere between 30 and 90 minutes per interview. On average, each interview lasted 67 minutes, 
with the median length 60 minutes. All of the interviews were digitally recorded and subsequently transcribed for 
analysis. 
 
4. FINDINGS 
 
4.1 Defining Distressed Loans 
 
With regards to the classification of distressed loans, the respondents were asked to indicate which criteria 
they use to define a distressed loan. Since there is no uniform or required definition of distressed loans, the banks 
indicated that they rely on their own criteria. These criteria are documented in written form in 11 of the 12 banks, 
with only one regional co-operative bank having no formal written definition. More specifically, the criterion of 
arrears payments is most often relied on with nine (75%) of the 12 banks using it. Six banks explicity refer to the 
Basel II default criteria or a delay of more than 90 days. The second most used criterion is the deterioration of the 
internal credit rating (5 banks). One third of the banks regard a loan as distressed if bankruptcy was filed. Two banks 
use the economic deterioration of the borrower, with one bank relying on adverse financial statement indicators. 
 
Regarding whether or not banks made a distinction between NPLs and SPLs, four (of which three were 
international and one regional) indicated that they do not make any formal distinction, whereas the remaining eight 
separate the two. All of the respondent banks consider NPLs as being defined in the narrow sense of distressed loans 
and also as being likely causes of liquidations and/or bankruptcies. On the other hand, SPLs were considered to be at 
the stage prior to being regarded as non-performing and thus had a chance of recovery. As one banker puts it 
“[r]egarding SPLs there is a chance for rescue. As long as a ‘hat is burning’, you can extinguish it. When 
eventually the ashes are smoking, it is too late.”  
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4.2 Internal Processes to Deal with Distressed Loans 
 
Eight banks (all five international banks and three regional banks) have more than one specialised unit 
dealing with distressed loans. Which unit the problem loan is assigned to depends on the type of loan and/or the 
relative degree of impairment. Furthermore, of the eight banks that distinguish between NPLs and SPLs four have 
more than one specialised unit and assign their SPLs to units specialised in intensive handling of the loan and then 
their NPLs to a further unit that focuses on more severely impaired loans. This is illustrated by the explanation of 
one banker: “Initially distressed loans are transferred to the ‘Intensive Handling’ unit, which is part of the Credit 
Risk Management Section (…). The loans located here are those that have been diagnosed with a ‘disease’ for the 
first time. In the Special Account Management [Sondergestion] unit we try to ‘heal’ the distressed loan. The third 
department, the Risk Administration [Risikoverwaltung] unit can be compared with a pathology department in a 
hospital, where loans are written off, liquidated and the collateral seized.” 
 
As opposed to the eight banks with multiple units dealing with distressed loans, three of the four remaining 
banks have only one specialised unit dealing with all types of distressed loans and the one remaining bank leaves 
these loans with the relationship banker. However, an expert is assigned to guide the relationship banker in dealing 
with the distressed loan. The names of these units are quite diverse. Even if banks use the same name, they do not 
always assign the same types of loans to this unit.  
 
There are major similarities in the main tasks of the workout units amongst the participating banks. 11 of 
the 12 banks indicated that their workout unit accompanies the restructuring of the distressed borrower, with five 
(four of them regional banks) indicating that this was their primary task. As two department heads stated: “The most 
important task is restructuring” and “[o]ur philosophy is to get extensively involved to help the customer through 
the crisis.” This finding therefore suggests that the workout units are primarily focused on assisting the client and 
finding a solution to the distressed nature of the loan. Hence, five banks also mentioned some form of intensive 
customer care such as active support, discussions and negotiations as one of the tasks of the specialised unit. 
 
While the majority of regional banks consider restructuring the distressed borrower as the overarching 
objective, international banks strongly indicated if restructuring was not possible, that they would not restructure the 
loan at all costs. They further made it clear that the mindset adopted when restructuring is more often than not based 
on the facts they have before them in terms of potential losses to the bank. As one banker remarks “[i]t is not our 
primary goal to file bankruptcies, but to accompany firms in their restructuring endeavours. This, however, must go 
along with the risk position of the bank. This does not mean, restructuring at all cost.” Another banker added 
“[g]enerally it is important to evaluate whether or not a loan can be reorganised. Repeat loan delinquencies are not 
the goal of the exercise.” Since restructuring is not possible for all distressed borrowers, the task of seizing collateral 
(five banks) and the legal examination of the contractual relationship (four banks) were examples of alternative 
actions taken most often by the banks. 
 
Since there is no legal definition that determines the conditions that require a bank to transfer distressed 
loans to the specialised workout unit, banks rely on different criteria to identify early warning signals of distressed 
loans. With eleven banks using a bundle of criteria, a deteriorating internal credit rating turned out to be the most 
important criterion and was applied by nine of the banks. Payments in arrears and/or liquidity problems were 
mentioned by five banks, and bankruptcy or near bankruptcy was a further criterion used by four banks. Although 
the banks do not all use the same criteria when deciding when to transfer distressed loans to the workout units, a 
common finding was that in order for the loan to be regarded as being ‘normal’ again, the internal credit rating of 
the distressed borrower must have improved, which implies that the profitability of the firm should have improved. 
 
With regards to the process of managing distressed loans within the workout department, eight of the 
interviewed banks mention some form of more intensive and active care for the distressed borrower. For example, 
the banks indicated that during times of distress, the frequency of communication between them and the borrower 
increases substantially. This in turn resulted in a more thorough examination of the borrower’s financial statements 
in order to assess any possibility of restructuring. Further to this, the banks also indicated that they examine the loan 
contract and/or collateral in detail and tend to tighten the loan prescriptions. These tightened conditions take several 
forms but increasing collateral requirements is used most often and a constant source of information as well as a 
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shortening of loan application cycles is usually required. Although the FMA-MS-K (2005 paragraphs 65-71) 
stipulate instructions and processing principles for intensified handling and the management of distressed loans, it 
does not provide any detail on how banks should deal with these loans. The findings seem to indicate a vast array of 
processes that are followed. 
 
Following how they deal with distressed loans, the respondent banks were asked to what extent the loans 
were separated from involving the personal banker who manages and services the (in this case distressed) client. 
Given that the minimum standards of the FMA (FMA-MS-K 2005, paragraph 68) require that the responsibility of 
restructuring, recovery and monitoring procedures of distressed loans does not lie with the front office, all 
interviewed banks adhere to this recommendation. If and to what extent the personal banker stays involved, 
however, varies amongst the banks. Seven banks transfer the distressed loan to the workout unit and do not give the 
personal banker a voice anymore. Four of these seven banks do not involve the personal banker at all after this 
transfer, whereas three provide some form of information flow between the workout unit and the personal banker. 
The remaining five banks either allow the personal banker generally or depending on the degree of impairment to 
stay involved. In three of them the personal banker stays the contact person for the distressed client and/or may 
express his opinion but has no decision-power anymore. For the remaining two banks the involvement depends on 
the degree of impairment. For example, one bank stated that “[t]here are three categories of customer support in 
our bank: A, B and C. A is the toughest category: everything is done by the Special Account Management 
department, no matter what. In case of category B the front office is involved in the determination of the terms and 
conditions of the loan, apart from that it has no decision authority. In category C the front office is responsible for 
customer care, the Special Account Management department only participates.”  
 
Similarly, the other bank stated that “[d]ifferent departments are responsible for customer care in our 
bank. Intensive handling is done by the operative risk management, i.e. the colleagues who have a look on the loan 
contract at least once a year. In case of problem loans, these time limits are shortened. The risk manager 
accompanies the personal banker when he visits a customer and can require specific constraints on applications. He 
is not always intensively involved in the execution. This is the responsibility of the front office. If some form of loan 
restructuring is associated with problem loans, we [the Special Account Management Department] take over the 
function of the risk manager. We, however, deal more intensively with the loan and have to get an overview within a 
very short time period. We examine loan and collateral contracts and accompany [the personal banker] to the 
customer. We are full partners to the front office. We try to enable a restructuring, in whatever form this might be 
possible. This is very case specific. If we believe that the front office cannot contribute any further, we take over the 
case completely. We are alone responsible, negotiate alone and are therefore the only interface to this customer.” 
This means that in the most severe form of distress, these two banks also do not allow any involvement of the 
personal banker. 
 
Consequently, six of the banks (four of them international banks) do not involve the personal banker at all 
in the process once the loan has deteriorated to a certain degree and in another three banks (one international bank) 
the personal banker only gets informed and/or serves as a source of information for the workout unit. Only three 
banks, all of them regional banks, allow the personal banker to stay involved in the management of problem loans. 
This is illustrated by the following statements from these three regional banks: “The personal banker has a voice, as 
he is very close to the customer and knows him well”; “[t]he personal banker can present his opinion, but he is not 
allowed to decide. He is not released but has to continue to care for the customer. The procedure stays the same as 
with all other clients. The difference is that he no longer has decision authority”; and “[w]e manage problem loans 
within the front office. The personal banker continues to be the contact person of the customer and is responsible for 
the administration. A specialist of the risk management department is by his side. Without this specialist he can do 
nothing.” 
 
As distressed loans pose higher constraints on the bank’s capital requirements, the amount of time a bank 
regards a loan as being distressed is an important consideration. The respondents indicated that on average distressed 
loans spend between one and five years in the workout department depending strongly on the degree of distress. The 
general consensus was further that in case of restructurings, the timeframe tended to be shorter when compared to, 
for example, liquidations (especially if these involve bankruptcies). The responses also suggest that international and 
larger banks tend to keep distressed loans in the specialised units for shorter periods of time than the regional banks.  
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The respondent banks were asked to indicate the size of the employee complement dealing with distressed 
loans in the workout department. In total, the number ranged from 10 to 120 employees in various stages of the 
workout. The responses also indicated a clear correlation between the size of the bank (in terms of employees) and 
the number of employees involved in the workout process. For example, the number of employees for the larger 
international banks ranges between 25 and 120 employees, whereas the smaller regional banks use between 10 and 
72 employees. Even if this is self-evident, the lower number of specialised workout managers in smaller banks can 
explain the longer time that smaller regional banks take to work out a distressed loan. They have a smaller and thus 
less specialised staff complement available as a resource for workout, which increases the tendency to make the 
workout process more hands-on and personal with the distressed borrower.  
 
4.3 Strategies to Deal with Distressed Loans 
 
Regarding the strategies banks use to deal with distressed loans, all banks rely on the internal workout and 
all except for one regional bank form bank pools. Loan sales are used by four banks, three of which being large and 
medium-sized international banks and one a small regional bank. Although none of the banks use bad banks, one is 
currently considering establishing one. 
 
Banks were then asked to identify why they chose the particular strategy to deal with distressed loans. Most 
of the banks indicated that the chosen strategy is dependent on the specific characteristics of the distressed loan (and 
indeed the distressed client) as well as the size of the outstanding loan and the number of parties the distressed 
borrower is liable to. Three banks suggested that they aim to maximise the recovery for the bank and therefore 
choose the strategy which promises the highest return. Four other banks later explained their decision for a certain 
strategy with the best results for the banks. Consequently, the bank’s return is a major decision determinant. Eight of 
the banks (all seven regional banks) further added that the chosen strategy must be compatible with the philosophy 
of the bank at strategic level or its business model. This seems to suggest that loan sales and establishing bad banks 
are the exception rather than the preferred practice. The following statements from two different regional banks 
support these findings: “Our main strategy is to be the partner of our clients. It is therefore not advantageous to sell 
NPLs or outsource them to a bad bank. Following our business policy, it has been decided not to sell NPLs due to 
regional reasons. We do not want to take a sledgehammer approach; we would rather like to be perceived as a 
partner” and “[d]ue to our business strategy we are the client’s partner. As such, we do not sell loans or outsource 
them to a bad bank, as good communication with the client is important to us. Our goal is to come to assist the 
client as much as possible.” 
 
Banks were then asked which criteria the distressed client has to meet in order to be able to further draw on 
his loan. Eleven banks argued that restructuring measures by the client are generally an important criterion that 
credit lines are maintained. Only one bank mentioned that this must not be the case and that it depends on the type of 
the loan and the collateral. Conversely, however, banks do not always call in the loan(s) if there are no restructuring 
measures. Instead, additional factors have to be met. These include a breach of the loan contract (default of payment, 
violation of covenants, mentioned by five banks) and/or a deteriorated or poor economic situation (three banks), 
which according to the standard business conditions of Austrian banks allows the bank to call in the loan, a hopeless 
situation of the borrower (four banks) and a loss of trust (two banks) or the lack of a basis for discussion (one bank). 
Regional banks in particular seem to be quite cautious to call-in distressed loans – four of the seven regional banks 
mentioned explicitly that the termination is considered as a measure of last resort. The different perspectives from 
respectively regional and international banks are illustrated by the following statements reflected in Table 2. 
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Table 2. Perspectives regarding the calling-in of loans 
STATEMENTS FROM REGIONAL BANKERS STATEMENTS FROM INTERNATIONAL BANKERS 
“If we as a bank have the impression that it is necessary to 
initiate measures in order not to worsen our situation, we call 
in the loan.” 
 
“Generally we call in loans, if there is a loss of trust, 
fraudulence and if collateral is held back. […] The client takes 
measures that result in a lack of trust so that we cannot carry 
on. Due to this measure the trust gets lost and the 
creditworthiness deteriorates so that we do not like the 
borrower to be our client anymore. In this case we are 
improving our situation by calling in the loan.” 
 
“We do not become active and call in the loan immediately, 
except when the client acts irresponsibly. For example if the 
borrower transfers its receivables to someone else in case of a 
cession or if he violates the contract and removes collateral, 
we will not hesitate to terminate the loan. Generally, we do not 
cast the first stone as the Hausbank.” 
 
“If the client is willing to restructure his firm, even if this is the 
case in bankruptcy, then we will generally not call in the loan. 
If, however, there is no basis for discussion anymore, we will 
terminate the loan. This may be a step in order to secure our 
own interests. But it is the exception.” 
“If survival is not evident or if it does not make sense at all 
and we are well secured, the termination of the loan is a 
reasonable strategy.” 
 
“Keeping still is like hitching a ride blindfolded. One is at the 
mercy of others. Waiting patiently and hoping for the best is 
not synonymous with our strategy. If we are of the opinion that 
we are getting into a situation with a higher probability of 
default, we will define measures that have to be met for 
prolonging the loan. These include requiring fresh equity, 
improving management, implementing operational 
restructuring or cutting back on overhead expenses. If this is 
not possible, we do not stay toothless. We [then] definitely 
prefer the callable receivables. With the help of the due date of 
the loan we keep the steering wheel in our hands.” 
 
“We definitely will not hold up loans, if there are no 
restructuring measures in the long-run.” 
 
 
Source: Excerpts from interviews with Austrian banks 
 
All except one bank use bank pools in dealing with distressed loans. In most cases, the establishment of the 
bank pool is not an explicit decision but follows rather from the fact that more than one bank is involved. This is 
illustrated by the following statement: “If there are several banks involved, we will form a bank pool in order to 
negotiate a collective approach and to communicate this jointly to the client. This way, we have a certain 
bargaining strength vis-á-vis the client. If there are bilateral transactions, we mostly decide for an internal workout, 
where we try to determine a restructuring strategy together with the client.”  
 
The importance of bank pools were therefore found to vary between banks. While all larger international 
banks consider bank pools as highly important and often take the lead, they are generally of medium importance to 
most regional banks. They were found to be of minor importance to one small regional bank and one international 
bank. A further small regional bank stated that it does not want to be involved in pools at all as “in recent years the 
co-operation with the other banks did not work out well.”  
 
With regards to the structuring of bank pools, most banks (eight) point out that the bank with the highest 
obligation (or amount outstanding) usually takes the lead in the pool. Apart from that, being the Hausbank 
(mentioned by five banks) and having a good relationship with the client (two banks) are of importance. A bank’s 
collateralisation might also be relevant (mentioned by three banks), as one international bank argued: “One will 
participate in bank pools if we are relatively badly collateralised. If our bank is better secured than the other banks, 
we do not see a reason to participate in a bank pool.” 
 
Three banks mentioned that being the pool leader involves much effort. This implies that banks are 
generally not eager to take the lead in a bank pool. As one banker explains: “This is no task banks are keen on 
grabbing as it involves a lot of effort.” As a result, most banks take different roles in bank pools depending on the 
specific situation they find themselves in. Two medium-sized regional banks, however, indicated that they prefer an 
active role in the process in order to better align their expectations and interests.  
 
Banks form bank pools for several reasons. The most prominent reasons pertain to it ensuring a coordinated 
approach (six banks) and avoiding a race for premature contract termination (five banks). Two banks also value the 
feature that risk is distributed amongst the participants. Since a coordinated approach is central to a bank pool, banks 
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emphasise the importance of a joint and mutual resolution: “It is not our strategy to enforce a better position for our 
bank compared to the other banks. You always meet at least twice. Naturally every bank struggles for optimisation 
but it becomes clear relatively soon where the upper and lower limits of one’s counterparts are. Thus, the strategy of 
a bank pool is to find a constructive, joint solution, quasi to pull together. It is of no help for any bank to do their 
own thing.” Contrary to this example there are banks that do so, as illustrated by the following statement: “There 
are banks we encounter regularly where one can leave when the pool gets formed as it is known that this bank is not 
prepared to engage in a constructive and collective solution.” In this case the other banks usually take over the 
position of the ‘stubborn’ bank: “If one bank does not perform within the pool, the other banks have to take over. 
Moreover, in particular, small banks with low amounts outstanding wish to get out and are finally replaced.” 
 
Banks were then asked which strategy they deemed to be the most important. Loan workouts were 
considered the predominant and also preferred strategy of distressed loan management in nine of the interviewed 
banks. One bank relies on internal workouts and bank pools as predominant strategies. One bank (with a relatively 
high percentage of distressed loans) prefers loan sales as it associates the least effort with this strategy and values the 
fact that the balance sheet turnover gets reduced and part of the outstanding money paid. Internal workouts are also 
widespread in this bank. One bank remarks “The strategies mentioned are no either or. They are intertwined. One 
cannot say this measure is used more often than the other. It is like a puzzle where one has several parts that have to 
be assembled.” 
 
With regards to the advantages of the respective strategies, eight banks (two international, six regional 
banks) mention the importance of the relationship to the customer. Since the banks focus on the restructuring of the 
loan within their workout efforts and aim at restructuring the distressed client, they consider workouts and bank 
pools most suited to continue and strengthen the borrower-bank relationship. Statements such as “[t]he client does 
not fall away as it is the case with a loan sale or outsourcing to a bad bank. That is why we associate sustainability 
within the workout”, “[b]y coming to the aid of the client to help him, the relationship with the client is 
strengthened” and “[t]he relationship with the client definitely grows within an internal workout” highlight the 
advantages with regards to the bank-client relationship within the workout process. Workouts are also preferred 
because banks consider them to bring about the best results, allow them an active involvement in the process and 
because of improved image reasons. 
 
5. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
 
The main findings concerning workout processes and strategies dealt with in the previous section are 
summarised in Table 3. 
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Table 3. Insights from Interviews 
Theme Findings 
Defining distressed 
loans 
• the vast majority of banks rely on the criterion of payments in arrears 
• other criteria used include the deterioration of the internal credit rating, bankruptcy filing and 
worsening of the borrower’s economic situation 
Specialised workout 
unit 
• all except one bank have a specialised unit dealing with distressed loans 
• two thirds (all international banks) have more than one such department 
• their tasks involve restructuring measures, active customer care, seizing of collateral and legal 
aspects 
• restructuring is often the primary goal, especially for regional banks 
Process of distressed 
loan management 
• more intensive and active care for distressed borrower 
• increase in frequency of communication 
• detailed examination of loan contract and/or collateral 
• tightening of loan conditions such as increasing collateral requirements, more intensified 
information flow and shortening of loan application cycles 
Involvement of 
personal banker 
• majority of banks do not involve the personal banker at all once the loan has deteriorated to a 
certain point, or only integrate the personal banker in the information flow 
• only three of seven regional banks allow the personal banker to stay involved as a contact person 
with the client 
Time in  
workout unit 
• depends strongly on the degree of impairment 
• in the case of restructurings the timeframe tends to be shorter than for liquidations 
• international and large banks appear to exhibit shorter workout timeframes  
Strategies for 
distressed loan 
management 
• loan workouts are the predominant and preferred strategy of the majority of banks 
• regional banks are quite cautious to call in loans and consider this to be a measure of last resort 
when the lender-borrower-relationship has deteriorated significantly 
• most banks participate in bank pools if the distressed client has several banking relationships; this 
strategy is more important for larger international banks 
• strategy chosen must be compatible with the strategy of the bank 
• relationship aspects are an important decision determinant, especially for regional banks 
 
Although the vast majority of both regional and international banks send distressed loans through an 
internal workout process, international banks are more likely to call-in loans, and tend to do so a lot sooner than the 
regional banks do. One banker of a small regional bank even suggested that this practice will probably continue in 
the future: “The large international banks, that do not care about their image per se, remain unyielding. Once a 
client has landed in a certain risk class, liquidation follows. The smaller banks however have endlessly more 
patience. For them, the client matters and loan sales do not follow. The core competencies of regional banks focus 
on supporting a distressed borrower to heal through restructuring.” Consequent to this, the interviews revealed that 
many regional banks indicated that the restructuring of distressed borrowers is seen to be an overarching principle in 
workout philosophy. 
 
Since regional banks are in general more decentralised and thus geographically closer to their clients, the 
results of this study seem to complement the study of Micucci and Rossi (2010) who analysed loan relationships of 
Italian SMEs and found that debt restructurings are more likely 1) the higher the geographic proximity between the 
bank and the SME, 2) the more the bank considers ‘soft’ facts, and 3) the more decentralised the bank is. The 
findings suggest therefore that the international banks tend to be more ‘hands-off’ when dealing with distressed 
clients and are more likely to primarily consider the financial costs (and thus liquidate) than what the regional banks 
are. In an attempt to support and lead the restructuring of the distressed borrower, the regional banks tend to be more 
’hands-on’ with distressed borrowers. This result suggests that banks who tend to rely more on relationship lending 
(regional banks) as opposed to a more ‘hands-off’ transactional lending approach seem to invest more time and 
effort in the restructuring of their client. This is also consistent with the findings of Shimizu (2012) who found that 
shinkin banks (small co-operative banks in Japan that specialise in relationship loans to small, unincorporated firms) 
enhance the recovery rate of these firms from financial distress and reduce their bankruptcy ratios by having a 
higher volume of distressed loans in their portfolios and granting their clients an extension of the loan repayment 
this way. The more the ratio of distressed loans in shinkin banks excels those of the larger banks, the lower the 
bankruptcy ratio of unincorporated firms. 
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Further to the tendency of regional banks to be more hands-on is the extent to which they use their 
resources to deal with distressed loans. All of the international banks have more than one specialised unit dealing 
with distressed loans, whereas the majority of regional banks tend to have only one unit which deals with all of the 
different types of distressed loans. There are several possible reasons explaining this. First, regional banks generally 
use less employees within their workout units suggesting that the workload per employee is higher. The resources 
regional banks have at their disposal are therefore a major constraint. Second, regional banks tend to keep distressed 
loans in the workout units for a longer period of time. In addition to being a result of fewer available resources, it 
can also be explained by their concerted, almost survivalist need to heal and recover distressed loans. Regional 
banks are more dependent on ensuring that distressed loans are recovered in order not to incur exorbitant financial 
losses. This follows that given the smaller loan portfolios of regional banks, they are more dependent on the 
recovery per unit than what the larger international banks are. Third, and encapsulating all of the above reasons, 
maintaining a hands-on relationship-based approach to dealing with their clients is important from a reputational 
point of view given their smaller loan portfolios and thus their reliance on the ‘closeness’ to their clients. It can be 
argued that the smaller regional banks would face larger relative losses caused by such reputational effects than the 
larger international banks would, merely due to the ability of international banks to absorb such losses. The fact that 
regional banks are more inclined to retain the services of the personal banker throughout the workout period pays 
testament to this. Further to this, given the larger market they function within, international banks are constantly 
weighing-up and exposed to new business opportunities, whereas regional banks have a smaller and somewhat 
limited market from which to get business. As a result, regional banks would be less inclined to terminate loans 
given the potential knock-on effect that it can have on the firm’s suppliers and employees, who may in turn have 
accounts with the bank. Loan termination suggests having a more pervasive effect on regional banks than on larger 
international banks. For international banks, therefore, restructuring distressed loans is not at any cost. 
 
While regional banks might indeed value relational aspects higher, it should be borne in mind that the 
quality and extent of the collateralisation is just as important. As one regional banker put it: “[Terminating the loan] 
is the last resort. We only harm ourselves if we do this as most cases are on the verge of bankruptcy and we are 
seldom if ever 100% secured.” 
 
Having a specialised unit that deals with distressed loans seems to pay off as the share of distressed loans 
within the total portfolio seems to be lower in banks that established their workout units earlier and therefore had the 
ability to adjust their portfolios and take care of these loans more intensively. This is also explained by one banker: 
“Previously problem loans stayed with the personal banker. Dealing with them, however, was difficult in the normal 
process of customer care. On the one hand, distressed loans require more intensive care and on the other it is 
extremely difficult to switch roles between being the personal banker and the restructurer.” 
 
At the heart of managing distressed loans lies the intention to reduce information asymmetry and the 
incentives of the borrower to misallocate the received funds. This intention is observed in our study. The 
interviewed banks deal more intensively with the distressed borrower, analysing the client more thoroughly and/or 
enforcing, for example, increased collateral requirements or tightening covenants. This way they attempt to reduce 
the information asymmetry and the concomitant risk that is inherent to the distressed nature of the loan. The 
enforcement of these covenants also assists to reduce the opportunistic behaviour of the distressed client and thereby 
ensures that the interests of the bank and the borrower are (more) aligned. This tightening of covenants complements 
previous studies amongst US companies that also experienced more restrictive loan conditions as a result of 
financial distress (Gilson 1990). It also corroborates the findings of Harhoff and Körting (1998) that financial 
distress results in higher collateral requirements for German SMEs. 
 
With regards to the type of strategy banks use to deal with distressed clients, bank pools seem to be of the 
highest importance for the larger international banks, whereas for the small and medium-sized banks they play a 
lesser role. This can be explained with the fact that they are less involved in large loans due to the statutory limit for 
amounts of single loans. However, banks that participate regularly in bank pools and who consider them of higher 
importance tend to have lower ratios of distressed loans. On the contrary, if bank pools play no or a minor role, this 
is associated with a trend toward a higher ratio of non- and sub-performing loans. When a bank participates in a 
pool, a joint solution is targeted and efforts are combined. Therefore, a bank that is not part of the pool might have 
its distressed loans in the portfolio for a longer period, which in turn exacerbates its problem loan ratio. 
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In theory, the sale of distressed loans is an important alternative in the management of problem loans. But 
only three of the five interviewed international banks and one regional bank use this option. On the other hand, most 
of the banks operating regionally cannot imagine making sales of distressed loans because of their strategy and their 
concern for the relationship with the client. All banks (except for one international bank) that do loan sales have 
relatively high ratios of distressed loans. Hence, the majority of these banks use loan sales in order to reduce their 
problem loans. This might also elucidate why one regional bank uses loan sales and simultaneously points out its 
opposition to loan sales – even if this is a profitable option – because of their strategy. This contradiction may be 
explained when the interviewed banker states that currently they experience a decrease in financial resources due to 
the loss of trust amongst savers that they can use for lending and that he expects no loan sales in regional banks in 
the future. Taking this and the fact into account that there is only a very small number of loan transactions per year 
in this bank, loan sales might be used as a way of freeing up capital for better loan deals but are not considered as an 
important strategy in managing distressed loans. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
Distressed loans are an important managerial consideration for banks and need to be dealt with in a manner 
that ensures that the bank has minimal losses, from both a financial and reputation point of view. This paper 
provided evidence of how a sample of different banks in the Austrian economy deals with such distressed loans. 
 
Loan workouts were found to be the predominant and preferred strategy for dealing with distressed loans, 
followed by bank pools. Since interviewees tend to favour options that assist the client to overcome the distressed 
nature of the loan and to continue the bank-borrower relationship, these two options seem most suited. Investigating 
the relational aspect of loan workouts further, regional and smaller banks in particular stress the relationship to their 
customer as an important decision determinant and seem to be more inclined to salvage the distressed loans. 
Moreover, the study found that smaller regional banked tended to use the relationship banker more actively in the 
process than larger international banks did. This finding highlights the importance of ensuring that the ‘healing’ of 
distressed loans is prioritised in the name of (financial) survival as well as minimising reputational effects. All in all, 
the smaller regional banks were found to be more ‘hands-on’ when dealing with their distressed loans than the larger 
international firms tended to be. 
 
Our findings may be relevant for banks and bank clients. Regarding the implications for banks, our results 
indicate that banks with larger and more specialised workout units exhibit lower ratios of distressed loans. 
Consequently, establishing a specialised task force with corresponding resources seems advisable. Second, banks 
that participate regularly in bank pools and consider these important have also lower ratios of impaired loans. 
Therefore, bank pools appear an adequate approach for co-ordinating the measures of the involved banks. For 
distressed clients it is important to understand the logic behind banks’ strategies in crisis situations. Banks rely on a 
vast array of processes in order to handle distressed loans. Most of them are intended to reduce the aggravated 
agency problems associated with the crisis. Consequently, distressed borrowers can proactively send positive signals 
to the bank through active communication, disclosures, implementation of restructuring measures etc. in order to 
convince the bank of the seriousness of their efforts and to reduce information asymmetry. Since several interviewed 
Austrian banks consider the termination of a loan as a measure of last resort, there still seems to be a high 
willingness among banks to help their distressed borrowers. Hence, ailing clients have to demonstrate that there are 
realistic turnaround prospects. Finally, the time in the workout department is related to the degree of impairment and 
tends to be shorter for restructurings. This indicates that the chances for success – from the client’s as well as the 
bank’s perspective – are higher the earlier counter measures are initiated. Consequently, banks should improve their 
early warning systems to detect impaired loans at an early stage. Concomitantly, borrowers should also be aware of 
the benefits of proactively approaching banks in case of distress and of initiating turnaround measures in time. 
 
In conclusion, a limitation to this study is that given its qualitative nature it is by no means representative of 
the entire Austrian banking sector. The findings do however provide valuable insights with regards to the processes 
and conduct of different types of banks to deal with distressed loans. Further research could be focused on 
comparing the results of this study to other European countries, especially those that have banks with active regional 
and international operations. A further study could also focus on identifying the specific quantitative criteria banks 
use to identify and manage distressed loans. This should create a situation where distressed borrowers are more 
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aware of the indicators banks rely on to identify problem loans and result in better management on the part of the 
borrower. 
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